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ABSTRACT
Wide agreement about the goal of microfinance—to improve the welfare of the
poor—has not led to wide agreement about how best to achieve that goal. To aid
discussion, I propose a framework for outreach—the social benefits of microfinance—in
terms of six aspects: worth, cost, depth, breadth, length, and scope. The framework
encompasses both the poverty approach to microfinance and the self-sustainability
approach. The poverty approach assumes that great depth of outreach can compensate
for narrow breadth, short length, and limited scope. The self-sustainability approach
assumes that wide breadth, long length, and ample scope can compensate for shallow
depth. I show how to use the framework for BancoSol of Bolivia.
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ASPECTS OF OUTREACH: A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION
OF THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF MICROFINANCE

1. Introduction
Microfinance is the supply of loans and savings services to the poor. Although
almost all microfinance practitioners agree that their goal is to improve the welfare of
the poor, they do not agree about how best to achieve this goal. Most approaches to
microfinance lie between the two extremes used as benchmarks here—the poverty
approach and the self-sustainability approach.
The poverty approach targets very poor clients who are very costly to serve. Like
relief efforts, it measures success by how well it fulfills the needs of the poorest in the
short term. In the poverty approach, donations cover the shortfall between revenue
from clients and the cost of supply.
The self-sustainability approach targets less-poor clients on the fringes of the
formal financial system. Like development efforts, it measures success by how well it
expands the frontier of the mainstream economy in the long term (Von Pischke, 1991).
In the self-sustainability approach, donations cover start-up costs and fund experiments
meant to find innovations that reduce the cost of supply so much that revenue from
clients can cover costs in the long term.1
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Rhyne (1998) calls the two sides the poverty camp and the self-sustainability
camp, while Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth (1998) call them institutionists and
welfarists. I prefer poverty approach and self-sustainability approach for three reasons.
First, the two sides are better described by approaches (frameworks and paradigms)
than by camps (distinct groups of people, perhaps armed for battle). Most microfinance
lenders do not subscribe to either camp as they attempt to synthesize what they see as
the best parts of each framework to match their own goals and context. Second,
1

As with most persistent debates, both approaches, given their assumptions,
make some sense (Morduch, 1998a; Rhyne, 1998; Woller, Dunford, and Woodworth,
1999). The feeling that one approach is obtuse or hides ulterior motives stems at least
in part from ignorance of the differences in assumptions that drive the differences in
approaches. To aid discussion, I propose a framework for outreach—the social benefits
of microfinance for poor clients—in terms of six aspects: worth to clients, cost to
clients, depth, breadth, length, and scope.2 The poverty approach assumes that great

economists distinguish between institutions (laws, policies, rules, and norms) and
organizations (a group of people who join together to work toward a common goal). All
organizations have rules and norms and thus institutions, but institutions many
correspond to more than one organization or to none. For example, a microlender is an
organization, its personnel policies are an institution, and the how it duns delinquent
borrowers is another institution. Both the poverty approach and the self-sustainability
approach are equally institutions in that they offer specific policies about to how best
to help the poor with microfinance. Third, although the self-sustainability approach
aims to strengthen organizations, its ultimate goal is to improve the lot of the poor,
just like the so-called welfarists. The nomenclature used here distinguishes the two
approaches by the intermediate outcomes used to monitor progress toward their
common goal. The proxy in one approach is self-sustainability, while the proxy in the
other is the poverty of the clients.
2

Since Yaron (1992), most serious attempts at the evaluation of the performance of
microfinance lenders has proceeded in terms of outreach (proxies for the benefits of
microfinance in terms of numbers of clients or average deposit amounts) and
sustainability (the ability to break even in an accounting period while compensating all
factors of production at their opportunity costs). Although the outreach-sustainability
framework was an improvement at the time, it has come to hinder progress for three
reasons. First, it does not make clear how to convert proxies into quantitative measures
of benefits. Indeed, the framework is often cited to argue for the lack of a need to
measure benefits. Furthermore, the measurement of costs in the framework ignores
costs borne by clients. Thus outreach-sustainability does not lead into benefit-cost
analysis, perhaps the most natural and defensible method of evaluation. Second, a
lender could live a long time even without meeting the definition of sustainability, and
a lender could also meet the definition yet still fail to live a long time (Schreiner, 1997).
Third, much the subsequent literature debates the supposed conflict between outreach
and sustainability (Rhyne, 1998; Mosley and Hulme, 1998; Christen et al., 1995). The
framework proposed here suggests that sustainability matters because it affects length,
2

depth can compensate for narrow breadth, short length, and limited scope. The selfsustainability approach assumes that wide breadth, long length, and ample scope can
compensate for shallow depth.
The new framework not only pinpoints the assumptions behind the two
approaches but also synthesizes the jargon of microfinance with that of standard
welfare theory. The social costs and benefits of microfinance will never be measured
perfectly, so most public-policy choices will turn on judgements that, because they
cannot be proven, must be argued. These arguments, subjective though they must be,
should rest as much as possible on empirical measurements and explicit assumptions.
The framework highlights the measurements to be made and the assumptions to be
made explicit. I show how to use the framework to estimate the net social benefits of
the best-known microfinance organization in Latin America, BancoSol of Bolivia.

and length matters because it affects social benefits. Thus, sustainability is not a goal
per se to be traded off against outreach but rather sustainability is a possible way to
achieve greater outreach.
3

2. The six aspects of outreach
2.1 Worth to clients
Worth of outreach to clients is defined as their willingness to pay. Worth hinges
on the terms of the financial contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities
of clients. For example, a miser has no use for loans but greatly values savings services.
Likewise, a loan of $100 is worth little to a farmer who wants $1,000 to drill a well.
For loans, worth increases as the terms of the contract are more closely matched
to borrower demand. Example dimensions of a loan include the amount disbursed, the
term to maturity, and the size of the installment. For deposits, worth increases with
the interest rate and as the contract is less restrictive, for example when minimum
balances are low and when withdrawals are convenient and unlimited.
Most economic models assume that worth to clients is the increase in business
profits for the client with-versus-without access to microfinance. In fact, microfinance
may improve the welfare of the poor even if it does not increase the profits of clients, so
the increase in their profits is just a lower bound on total worth. For example, savings
services may buffer shocks, and loans may fund life-cycle events such as weddings or
funerals. Often the most important effect of microfinance is to help households to
diversify their sources of income (Morduch, 1998b; Mosley and Hulme, 1998).
The worth of microfinance to clients is only part of the worth of microfinance to
society. For example, if microfinance strengthens small enterprises, then it may also
help non-clients through new hires or through backward and forward linkages.
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It is difficult to measure worth to clients, in part because worth depends on the
subjective gain that a client gets from a financial contract and in part because it is
difficult to know what would have happened in the absence of microfinance. As stated
above, a lower bound on worth is the increase in business profits. For example, Hulme
and Mosley (1996) found that the change in net income in a year for 16 experienced
borrowers in BancoSol was about twice that of 16 borrowers who had just got their
first loan. The lower bound on worth was about $300 per year.

2.2 Cost to clients
Cost of outreach to clients is the sum of price costs and transaction costs. Price
costs are direct cash payments for interest and fees. Price costs are revenue for the
microfinance organization. Transaction costs are non-price costs for both non-cash
opportunity costs—such as the time to apply for a loan—and indirect cash expenses for
such things as transport, documents, food, and taxes needed to use a financial contract.
Transaction costs borne by clients are not revenue for the microfinance organization.
The best measure of price costs is the internal rate of return, defined as the
interest rate that, for the client, would make the present value of the cash flows of a
financial contract zero. Transaction costs can be estimated from survey data on the
miles, minutes, and money required to use a financial service.
For BancoSol, the Inter-American Investment Corporation (1991, cited in Hulme
and Mosley, 1996) estimates that, for a two-month loan of $200 in the first half of 1993,
price costs were $25 and non-cash opportunity costs were $33. Indirect cash expenses

5

were assumed zero. If a client repays $100 of principal each month, then the cost to a
client of a dollar-year of borrowed purchasing power is 12@$58/($200+$100) = $2.32.
Cost to clients is distinct from cost of supply and from cost to society. The cost
of supply is the opportunity cost of the resources used by a microfinance organization.
The cost to society includes the cost to clients, the cost of supply, and any other costs
borne by non-clients. For example, non-clients bear displacement costs when clients
with loans squeeze them out of markets.
All else constant, progress in microfinance stems from reductions in the cost of
supply. This increases access, defined as the ability and willingness to use financial
contracts at a price that covers the long-run cost of efficient supply. More access is
progress because it makes the use of financial services depend more on demand and less
on the constraints of supply. For example, the innovation of joint-liability contracts
allowed deeper outreach at a lower cost of supply than when all loans required physical
collateral. The key is not to take risks that banks shun but rather to find new, low-cost
ways to judge and to curb risk.
Net gain to clients is defined as worth minus cost, the increase in welfare due to
microfinance. Net gain is willingness to pay—the highest cost that a client would agree
to bear for a financial contract—minus the cost borne. The concept of net gain is like
that of consumer surplus in welfare theory.
If clients have no alternative source of loans, then one measure of the size of the
net gain is simply willingness to pay (worth). A second measure is the difference in the
cost of a dollar-year of debt from a microfinance lender versus from another source.
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The Inter-American Investment Corporation (1991, cited in Hulme and Mosley, 1996)
estimated the cost for clients of Bolivian moneylenders for a dollar-year of debt from a
$200, two-month loan as 12@$77/($200+$100) = $3.08. The use of BancoSol would thus
produce a net gain of $3.08!$2.23 = $0.85 per dollar-year of debt. The average loan
from BancoSol in 1992 had a term of 4.6 months and a size of 91 dollar-years. Most
clients get new loans as soon as they pay their old ones and thus use 91@(12/4.6) Ñ 237
dollar-years per year and have a net gain of 237@$0.85 Ñ $200 per year.
Rather than measure the size of the net gain, it is simpler and less expensive to
check the sign of net gain. Most clients will not enter into a contract unless they expect
a positive net gain. Although clients may overestimate worth and/or underestimate
cost once, they are unlikely to do so twice. Thus, for repeaters, net gain is probably
positive. For example, BancoSol made 848,000 loans to 210,000 borrowers between 1987
and 1998. The average borrower had 848,000/210,000 Ñ 4 loans and thus probably had
positive net gains. Of course, some borrowers drop out even through net gain is
positive—not all people want debt all the time. Also, if borrowers use informal loans to
repay microfinance loans and then use their next microfinance loan to repay the
informal loan, then repeated use need not signal a positive net gain. Usually, however,
repeated use does suggest that net gain is positive.

2.3 Depth
Depth of outreach is the value that society attaches to the net gain of a given
client. In welfare theory, depth is the weight of a client in the social-welfare function. If
society has a preference for the poor, then poverty is a good proxy for depth. For
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example, society likely prefers that a street child or a widow get a given net gain than
that a richer person get the same net gain.
Direct measurement of depth through income or wealth is difficult. Simple,
indirect proxies for depth are sex (women are preferred), location (rural is preferred),
education (less is preferred), ethnicity (minorities are preferred), housing (small, flimsy
houses are preferred), and access to public services (lack of access is preferred).
For a sample of borrowers of BancoSol in 1992, Hulme and Mosley (1996, pp. 52,
71, and 88) report “average beneficiary income” as $360 and “family income” as $3,000.
About 78 percent of a sample of borrowers in greater La Paz in late 1995 were women
(Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). Two-thirds had not attended high school, and 97 percent
had not attended college. About 57 percent had indoor toilets, 84 percent had running
water, and 95 percent had electricity.
Furthermore, Navajas et al. (1999) compare an index of fulfillment of basic
needs for this same sample with a similar index from a census. About 80 percent of the
borrowers of BancoSol were bunched just above or just below the poverty line. About
16 percent were far above the poverty line, and about 5 percent were far below it.
The most common proxy for depth is loan size. The size of a loan, however, has
five dimensions (Figure 1 on page 30). Although it is common to look only at the
amount disbursed, size may also be seen as the term to maturity, the amount of
installment, or the time between installments. The best measure of size is the average
amount outstanding in terms of dollar-years of borrowed purchasing power. Along each
dimension of size, smaller amounts or shorter times usually mean greater depth because
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poorer clients are less able to signal their risk to lenders and so they receive smaller
loans for shorter times until they demonstrate their ability and willingness to repay.
Loan size differs for first loans versus repeat loans and when measured as a
mean versus a median. The estimated mean amount disbursed to new borrowers in
BancoSol in greater La Paz in late 1995 was $190, and the median was $110. For
repeat loans, the mean amount disbursed was $640, and the median was $380. As
usual, the mean exceeds the median because the distribution of loan size is skewed to
the right. Thus the median is the best gauge of loan size for a typical borrower.
Although deep outreach increases social benefits, it also usually increases social
costs because it increases the per-unit cost of supply. It is more costly to judge the risk
of the poor because they are more diverse and less able to signal creditworthiness
(Conning, 1999). Fixed costs also matter more for the poor—for both supply and
demand—because transactions are smaller and more frequent. Coverage of the costs of
greater depth usually requires either more donations or higher prices.
The poverty approach places a very high weight on the poorest and little or no
weight on anyone else. In contrast, the self-sustainability approach is more willing to
make trade-offs between the poorest and the less-poor.

2.4 Breadth
Breadth of outreach is the number of clients. Breadth matters because of budget
constraints; the wants and needs of the poor exceed the resources earmarked for them.
All else constant, the breadth of the poverty approach depends on the level of
donations that it can attract.
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Self-sustainable organizations with wide breadth may reach as many of the very
poor as poverty-oriented organizations with narrow breadth (Rosenberg, 1996). For
example, some self-sustainability-oriented credit unions in Colombia had more poor
clients than some poverty-oriented village banks in Costa Rica and Guatemala (Paxton
and Cuevas, 1998). Although the poor were a very small share of the loan portfolios of
the credit unions, the portfolios were very big, and many poor people held deposits.
Morduch (1998a) defends the poverty approach with reference to some common socialwelfare functions. Suppose that a tenth of the clients at a self-sustainable lender are
poor, that half of the clients at a poverty-oriented lender are poor, and that net gain
per client is the same for both lenders. To have the same effect on social welfare, the
self-sustainable lender must have 15 to 125 times the breadth of the poverty lender. As
with the other five aspects, breadth cannot be considered by itself.

2.5 Length
Length of outreach is the time frame of the supply of microfinance. If society
cares about the welfare of the poor both now and in the future, then length matters.
Length is difficult to measure because it occurs in the future. The profits of the lender
are a proxy because, in the absence of guaranteed donations, profits signal some ability
to buy resources on the market and thus offer some hope to survive if donors leave.
In principle, profits are not sufficient for length. Furthermore, profits are not
necessary for length because donations could last forever. In practice, however, most
lenders will not get donations forever, at least not from public sources.
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In 1996, BancoSol made a profit of $1.5 million. Without public help, however,
profit would have been about zero (Schreiner, 1997). Thus, even without donations,
BancoSol could have maintained the real size of its assets. Furthermore, BancoSol was
regulated and had experienced managers, a consistent structure of incentives, and a
board of directors with a clear mission to seek constant improvement in service of the
poor. I believe that BancoSol had great expected length.

2.6 Scope
Scope of outreach is the number of types of financial contracts supplied. Scope
between products might mean both loans and savings services. Scope within a product
might mean loans to both groups and individuals. Furthermore, scope within a product
means contracts with different terms. For example, a loan of $100 with one repayment
due in one month is not the same product as a loan of $200 with amortized
installments due each month for a year.
The poverty approach tends to limits its scope to just loans. The selfsustainability approach pays lip service to ample scope through savings services as well
as loans, but in fact few microfinance organizations provide both. BancoSol has
uncommonly ample scope not only because it offers loans with a variety of terms but
also because, as a bank, it offers savings services.

In sum, depth is the social value of net gain, where net gain is worth to clients
minus cost to clients. Breadth is number of clients, length is years of service, and scope
is types of contracts. The social benefit of the outreach of a microfinance organization
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is net gain weighted by depth, summed across breadth of clients and across scope of
contracts, and summed and discounted through length of time.

12

3. Trade-offs and feedback
Each of the six aspects of outreach depends on the other five. For example, the
supply of passbook savings increases depth and breadth as well as scope because people
too poor to borrow can still save. Savings services may also increase length; an
organization that can attract private savings and fulfill regulatory requirements has
external checks on its financial and organizational strength. The supply of passbook
savings, however, increases the overall cost of supply and thus leads to higher prices for
those services—such as loans—that directly earn revenue. All else constant, this
increase in price reduces net gain per borrower. The change in social benefits due to a
change in one aspect of outreach depends on how all six aspects interact.
Social benefits depend on worth, cost, depth, breadth, length, and scope, but the
greatest of these is length. The debate between the poverty approach and the selfsustainability approach hinges on the effects of length on the other five aspects. More
length requires either more profit for the lender or more donations, and profits and
donations affect all aspects of outreach through their effects on incentives. All else
constant, more profit for the lender requires higher prices and thus implies more cost to
clients, less profits for clients, and less net gains per client. In practice, the drive for
profits for the lender also tends to reward innovations that either increase worth to
clients or decrease cost to clients. This happens both because higher worth allows
higher prices without smaller net gains and because lower costs allow higher net gains
without lower prices. The drive for profits for the lender may also lead to long-term
increases in breadth and length that may offset short-term decreases in net gains per
13

client. Donations provide weaker incentives for innovation than profits because donors
do not reward innovation and punish stagnation as consistently as clients because their
own welfare is not as directly at stake. Donations do, however, reduce the need for high
prices which, all else constant, increases net gain per client.
The poverty approach assumes that the higher net gain per client swamps the
negative effects on length of low lender profits and of donations. The self-sustainability
approach assumes that the positive effects on length of lender profits compensates for
the lower net gain per client. The point here is that arguments for either approach
should account for all six aspects of outreach and for their interactions through time.
The poverty approach must discuss more than just depth, and the self-sustainability
approach must discuss more than just length.
The case of BancoSol shows some of the possible trade-offs and patterns of
feedback. In 1992, BancoSol was split off from PRODEM, a non-government
organization founded in 1987 (Mosley, 1996). Although PRODEM was successful
compared with most other microfinance organizations, its stakeholders believed that its
NGO status constrained its potential breadth, length, and scope. For example,
PRODEM was not regulated and thus could not mobilize savings. Furthermore, the
founders of BancoSol hoped that its for-profit status would help to attract private
investment; PRODEM had been frustrated by the slow, strings-attached processes
required to get cheap funds from donors. Finally, the donors involved wanted to test
whether an NGO could become a bank. The partial replacement of donors with market
forces was a way for the sometimes-but-not-always-altruistic stakeholders of BancoSol
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to commit to make the effort required to make a profit and, hopefully, to improve the
welfare of the poor more.
The precommitment mattered because success was more difficult as a bank than
as an NGO. Managers with experience in big, impersonal banks slowly replaced many
of the visionaries and social workers who had founded PRODEM. With most growth
financed with loans and deposits from private sources, the cost of liabilities rose. To
comply with regulation, BancoSol had to overhaul its computer system at huge costs.
Rather than shift these increases in the cost of supply to clients, BancoSol
improved efficiency. It did this in part through bigger and longer loans as clients aged
and revealed their risk and in part through economies of scale. The push to cut average
costs led to growth in the number of clients with debt from 23,000 in 1991 to 81,000 in
1998. In late 1995, 12 percent of households in greater La Paz had debt with BancoSol
(Navajas et al., 1999).
In 1996, 1997, and 1998, return on equity was 18, 23 and 43 percent. To get
profits for shareholders, BancoSol had to provide net gains for clients. Costs to clients
decreased in 1994 when BancoSol dropped its requirement for compensating balances
and when the real yield on the loan portfolio fell from 45 percent in 1992 to 35 percent
in 1998. Worth to clients also increased in 1996 when BancoSol, which had until then
made all loans through groups, started to make some individual loans.
Did these increases in net gain, length, and scope cause depth to decrease?
Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997) find that the size of loans to new borrowers did not change
much through time. Increases in the average amount disbursed and in the term to
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maturity were due not to mission drift but rather to growth in client demand and in
knowledge of the risk of repeat clients. In fact, BancoSol may have started to court
even poorer borrowers to gain market share. At BancoSol, the search for profits
increased worth, cost, breadth, length, and scope, and did not decrease depth.
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4. Outputs, benefits, and costs
The poverty approach usually tries to measure only social benefits, while the
self-sustainability approach usually tries to measure only social costs. The social worth
of microfinance, however, depends on both benefits and costs. As far as I know, this
section is the first attempt to measure both of them in a present-value framework.

4.1 Cost-effectiveness analysis
Benefit-cost analysis compares social benefits with social costs. In contrast, costeffectiveness analysis compares outputs with social costs. The estimate of social cost per
unit of output is useful because outputs are less expensive to measure than benefits.
Knowledge of average costs does not imply knowledge of average benefits. Still,
average costs may be enough to guide policy choices and to inform subjective
judgements of the social worth of microfinance organizations because average costs tell
the minimum level of average benefits required for social benefits to exceed social costs.
Whether actual (unmeasured) average benefits could be this high must still be argued,
but cost-effectiveness analysis at least provides a benchmark. If average costs are very
high or very low, then measurement of social benefits may be moot.
For the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, the best-known microfinance organization
in the world, an estimate of the average social cost of a year of membership is $8
(Schreiner, 1997). Although no one knows for sure, most experts would guess that
unmeasured benefits probably exceed $8 per year (e.g., Pitt and Khandker, 1998).
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The social cost of BancoSol from 1987-1996, measured as the present value of
cash flows from public donors, was $2.1 million (Schreiner, 1997).3
In 1987-1996, BancoSol produced 30.7 million discounted dollar-years of
borrowed purchasing power. Thus, social cost per unit of output was $2.1/30.7 Ñ $0.07.
Thus, BancoSol was a good social investment if the average borrower got a net gain of
10 cents or more per dollar-year of debt. In section 2.2, I estimated net gain as $0.85.
Although both of these estimates are quite rough, their relative magnitudes suggest
that the social benefits of BancoSol probably exceeded social costs, even if displacement
of non-borrowers was 50 percent (Bendick and Egan, 1987).

4.2 Benefit-cost analysis
Net benefits are the social value of outreach minus social cost. To compute net
benefits, I write a formula that combines the six aspects of outreach in a measure of
social value. Let t index length in years from 1 to T. Let st index scope as the number
of types of contracts in year t from 1 to St. For a given type of contract st, let breadth
be Nts, with each client indexed by nts. Let the worth in year t of product st to client nts
be wtsn, and let the cost be ctsn. Net gain is worth wtsn minus cost ctsn.

3

Social opportunity cost was taken as 20 percent per year in real terms. The results
are robust to opportunity costs between 0 and 30 percent. Private funds have no
imputed social opportunity cost because I assume that private sources make sure that
their own benefits exceed their own costs when they put their own funds in BancoSol.
In contrast, I assume that public sources cannot be trusted to make sure that the social
returns from BancoSol exceed those of the marginal development project.
18

To value depth of outreach, let the function Dtsn(wtsn!ctsn) give the social value in
year t of the net gain from contract st for client nst. The social-welfare function W(@)
aggregates the social value of net gains across clients, contracts, and time:

Social value of net gains ' W[ D111 ( w111 ! c111 ) , . . . , DTS

TNTS T

(wTS

TNTS T

cTS

TNTS T

)] . (1)

The time frame for BancoSol is 1987-1996. For simplicity, I ignore individual
loans and assume that scope includes only group loans until the introduction of savings
services in 1992. I also ignore all variation in contractual terms in all years. I assume
that all large time deposits were held by the rich with no social benefit and that all
small passbook deposits were held by the poor with a net gain per dollar-year on
deposit of $0.02. As estimated above, the net gain for each dollar-year of debt is $0.85.
To use the general social-welfare function W(@) in equation 1, I assume a specific
form that is additively separable across time, clients, and products. The discount rate *
= 1/(1+r), and the social rate of time preference r is 0.20 in real terms for all years.
Finally, I must choose a functional form to value depth. To keep things simple, I
assume Dtsn(wtsn!ctsn) = (wtsn!ctsn) 0.9/D, where

= 0.94 is the average index of

fulfillment of basic needs for borrowers of BancoSol in greater La Paz in late 1995 and
where the poverty line is 0.9. This form of D(@) implies that the social value of a given
net gain increases as clients are poorer and decreases as clients are richer. For example,
a given net gain for someone with an index of 0.45 has four times the social value as for
someone with an index of 1.8 (0.9/0.45 = 2 versus 0.9/1.8 = 0.5).
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Other functional forms may have better theoretical support (Deaton, 1997). The
assumptions here are meant to lead to a simple formula that combines the six aspects
of outreach in a measure of the social value of net gains to clients:
St

N ts

Social value of net gains ' j j j *t @ ( 0.9/ D) @ ( wtsn ! ctsn ) .
T

(2)

t'1 s'1 n'1

To compute this in a spreadsheet, note that the sum of net gains across all
clients Nts for a contract st in year t is the same as the net gain per dollar-year of debt
or on deposit multiplied by the average number of dollar-years of debt or deposits, q) ts.
If I replace *t with ,t, a discount factor that recognizes the quirks of discounting
average stocks (Schreiner, 1997), then I can write:
Social value of net gains ' 0.96 @

j ,t @ 0.85 @ qt1 % j ,t @ 0.02 @ qt2 .
T

T

t'1

t'1

(3)

The result is in the last cell of Table 1 on page 29. For 1987-1996, the estimated
discounted social value of net gains to clients of BancoSol is $25.6 million. Given social
costs of $2.1 million, net social benefits are $23.5 million. Subject to the imperfect
assumptions, gross simplifications, and coarse estimates used here, BancoSol was a
good use of public funds earmarked to help the poor.

4.3 Caveats
This result is, to say the least, very rough and of unknown precision. The
estimate of net social benefits rests on a legion of heroic assumptions, especially with
regard to worth to clients, social opportunity costs, and the forms of the social-welfare
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function and the depth function. For example, estimated social costs ignore subsidies
from unreported deposits held by public entities. Furthermore, estimated social benefits
ignore demonstration effects in Bolivia and elsewhere even though these effects were the
main reason donors created BancoSol. Thus, the exercise here should be viewed not as
a definitive measurement but rather as an attempt to show how the new framework of
outreach can help to think about net social worth. Finally, BancoSol is one of the best
microfinance organizations in the world—estimates of its net social worth do not apply
to other microfinance organizations nor to the microfinance movement as a whole.

21

5. Discussion
The poverty and self-sustainability approaches start from different assumptions
about the six aspects of outreach. The poverty approach assumes that it is best to help
a few very poor people a lot for a short time with only loans; the self-sustainability
approach assumes that it is best to help many less-poor people a little for a long time
with a range of financial services. Neither approach has recognized that social benefits
depend on all six aspects and that a change in one aspect changes all the other aspects.
Arguments for either approach should use empirical measurements and explicit
assumptions about each aspect.
The essence of my own argument is that the poor are many but the donor
dollars are few, that society cares about the poor both now and in the future, and that
self-sustainability produces the strongest incentives to improve social benefits through
time. The self-sustainability approach tries to weave a web of reinforcing incentives
that reward those stakeholders who improve the welfare of clients. The poverty
approach relies more on altruism. As an economist in a school of social work (and as a
human), I recognize the power of both selfishness and selflessness. I favor selfsustainability because selfishness is more robust to selflessness than vice versa. For
example, if all stakeholders are always altruistic, then self-sustainability does no harm;
stakeholders will give back to the poor the rewards diverted from them to satisfy the
supposed selfishness of the stakeholders. If, however, some stakeholders are sometimes
selfish, then self-sustainability constrains the harm that their selfishness inflicts on the
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target group. Greed is not good, but a system that recognizes that some people are
sometimes greedy may well improve the common good best.
The poverty approach relies on altruism to attract resources and to motivate
effort for innovation and efficiency. As a point of logic, altruism may be the best
strategy. Perhaps altruism is enough to drive stakeholders to work to improve the
welfare of the poor, or perhaps non-self-sustainable microfinance is the most efficient
way to help the poor. After all, selfish incentives may fail to prompt enough innovation
and efficiency to make net gains in the self-sustainability approach bigger than in the
poverty approach. My own belief, however, is that microfinance is a weak tool to help
the very poor, especially with a focus on loans instead of savings. Even if worth to very
poor clients is very high, the cost of supply is also very high.
Self-sustainability assumes that length of outreach helps the poor best because,
with uncollateralized loans to borrowers without steady cash flows from wage jobs in
places without credit bureaux, the chief motive to repay—apart from honesty—is the
promise of access to future loans. Non-permanent lenders—those without profits or
perpetual donations—will suffer from default. Default does not improve social welfare,
at least not as much as a pure gift would. It destroys the lender, makes liars out of
borrowers and gives them a bad credit record, and steals from the poor of the future.
Because donations are limited, length usually requires profits, at least for lenders with
much breadth. In turn, the drive for profits for lenders tends to improve all aspects of
outreach, except perhaps depth. Increases in worth or decreases in the cost of supply
allow a lender both to increase profits and to maintain or increase net gains per client.
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Self-sustainability may still require some altruism. If, as depth increases, worth
to clients does not increase as fast as the cost of supply, then profits for the lender
and/or net gains per client must decrease. Because depth matters, microfinance
organizations must constrain creep toward less-poor clients who cost less to serve. In
the poverty approach, selfless concern for the poor constrains mission drift. In the selfsustainability approach, constraints on creep take three forms. First, competition or
growth may push organizations toward unserved niches. Second, unless costs are
subsidized, microfinance mostly attracts the unserved because costs to clients in
microfinance exceed costs to clients who can use banks. Third, stakeholders may be
both selflessly concerned for the poor and selfishly concerned with profit for the lender.
Thus self-sustainability does not rule out altruism and may require it to ensure depth.
It is probably less difficult to find stakeholders who balance selfishness with selflessness
than to find completely selfless stakeholders.
Both approaches must find people who will sacrifice lender profits for depth or
effort for efficiency. Although most people are often selfless and although altruism finds
strong support from gurus, saints, and deities, the main force for development through
time has been structures of incentives that reward those who increase the welfare of
others (North, 1994). Selfless stakeholders are scarce, at least in the numbers needed to
help the masses of the poor both now and in the future. Because altruism is beyond the
scope of public policy, self-sustainability aims to use what selflessness it can get now to
create a system that will serve the poor regardless of future altruism. Although private
people are free to support the poverty approach, public policy should focus on self-
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sustainability; only those shepherds who tend their own flocks can leave them to search
for a single lost sheep.
A commentator on an early draft said that “the one thing we have learned is
that the success of microfinance organizations rests with their providing the right
incentives.” Likewise, the founder of the Grameen Bank has written “If we create
appropriate financial and social incentives, socially conscious enterprises can become an
effective force in the marketplace” (Yunus, 1998, p. 62). While both these statements
are true, they are not very helpful for policy. The big question is not whether to have
the right incentives, but rather how to get them, and indeed, how to know which
incentives are right. The framework for outreach presented here shows how the poverty
approach and the self-sustainability approach attempt to answer these questions.
Incentives in the poverty approach derive from altruism and from a selfless concern for
the welfare of others, while incentives in the self-sustainability approach derive from
the market and from a selfish concern for one’s own welfare.
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Table 1: Social value of net gains to clients of BancoSol, 1987-1996
Line
A
B
C
D

Discount factor for average stocks, Eta
1/Rho
Net gain to a dollar-year of debt
Net gain to a dollar-year on deposit

Source
Data
Data
Data
Data

E
F

Dollar-years of debt
Dollar-years of deposits

Data
Data

G
H

Accum. discounted dollar-years of debt
G(t-1)+A*E
Accum. discounted dollar-years on deposit H(t-1)+B*F

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
0.865 0.753 0.626 0.521 0.438 0.363 0.301 0.255 0.213 0.177
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.1
0.0

0.4
0.0

0.7
0.0

1.8
0.0

3.3
0.0

6.1
0.7

15.8
0.9

31.9
1.6

30.9
2.8

37.0
3.6

0.1
0.0

0.3
0.0

0.8
0.0

1.7
0.0

3.1
0.0

5.3
0.7

10.1
1.6

18.2
3.1

24.8
5.8

31.4
9.2

I
Social value of net gain to clients
0.96*(0.85*G+0.02*H)
0.0
0.3
0.6
1.4
2.5
4.4
8.3
14.9
20.4
Source: Data from BancoSol and from Schreiner (1997). All monetary figures are in millions of constant dollars as of December 1998
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Figure 1: Five dimensions of the size of a loan

Amt. installment

Amount disbursed

$

Average amount outstanding
(dollar-months of borrowed purchasing power)

Term to maturity
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